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The purpose of this paper is to review the impact of the global financial crisis on banking 
reform in China. The significant doubt concerning the efficiencies of Anglo-American model 
of corporate governance has raised a critical political question amongst scholars and 
practitioners as to whether China should continue to follow the U.K.-U.S. path in relation to 
financial reform. This conceptual paper provides an insightful review of the corporate 
governance literature and regulatory reports. After examining the fundamental limitations of 
the laissez-faire philosophy that underpins the neo-liberal model of capitalism, which 
promotes greater liberalization and less control, the paper considers the risks in opening 
China’s financial markets and relaxing monetary and fiscal policies.  A critique of 
shareholder-capitalism is outlined in relation to the German’s “social market economy” 
styled capitalism. Through such analysis the paper explores a number of implications for 
China to consider in terms of developing a new and sustainable corporate governance model 











The past few years have witnessed a series of major reforms of China’s state-owned 
commercial banks, insurance companies and securities companies in light of modern 
enterprise systems. The development of China’s financial service sector means financial 
product innovation with the further opening of financial markets and the development of the 
insurance and bond market, has increased liquidity as well as reduced financial risks. The US 
subprime crisis indicated that financial innovations can be beneficial for the economy, but 
without proper control, they may lead to unexpected consequences. Kirkpatrick (2009) argues 
that the financial crisis can be attributed to failures and weaknesses in corporate governance 
arrangements and insufficient accounting standards and regulatory requirements, which have 
failed to serve their purpose to safeguard against excessive risk taking in a number of 
financial services companies. Similar to the financial crises of the last decade, the global 
financial crisis (GFC) which sparked in 2008, surfaced a variety of significant corporate 
governance failures – the dysfunction of market mechanisms, the lack of transparency and 
accountability, misaligned compensation arrangements and the late response of government 
all which encouraged management short-termism, poor risk management, as well as some 
fraudulent schemes. The unique characteristics of the Chinese banking system have proved to 
be an interesting point for studying post-crisis corporate governance reform. Considering that 
China’s governance system was modelled on the Anglo-American system which prevailed in 
U.S.-U.K., this paper examines the impact of the financial crisis on corporate governance 
reform in developed economies particularly examining China’s reform of its banking sector. 
In particular, the paper examines Chinese government’s role in bank supervision and risk 
management. In this regard, the paper contributes to the corporate governance body of 
literature within the Chinese context by providing insights into the contributing factors to the 
corporate governance failure that led to the global financial crisis.  
 
China’s Banking Sector and the Global Financial Crisis 
China’s banking sector has been relatively less affected by the GFC due to China’s “closed” 
capital account and insulated banking sector primarily relying on deposits and not being 
exposed to risky Western financial instruments (Schmidt 2009). Ma (2008) summarises that 
large foreign exchange reserves, unconvertible RMB and an under-developed banking sector 
have helped to explain why China has not been too much affected by the GFC. Given the 
government’s huge fiscal stimulus package (RMB 4 trillion or approximately $585 billion), 
the impressive resultant growth has been maintained, evidenced by the 8.7 percent increase in 
GDP in 2009, by far the best among the G20 economies (Lo 2010). This strong growth, 
however, is not sustainable. China's financial system has faced the problems that have arisen 
as a result of the surge in bank lending as part of the fiscal stimulus program, the further 
financial liberalization, the internationalization of Chinese banks and the eventual 
convertibility of the RMB  (Bell and Chao 2010).  
 
The Debate on Financialised Capitalism  
Adam Smith (1776) states that a free and competitive market economy enables corporations 
to efficiently and effectively use society’s resources to create value and use market 
mechanisms to prevent corporations from abusing their power and defrauding their 
stakeholders. The existence of free markets may facilitate reallocations of scare resources in 
their most productive way (Moerland 1995). It is argued that the competitive market 
economy is in the best interest of shareholders but also of the economy as a whole. Based on 
the concept of market capitalism, the Anglo-American governance system is founded on the 
belief that self-interest and de-centralised markets can function in a self-regulating manner 
(Cernat 2004). The Anglo-American model is characterised by well-developed financial 
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markets, dispersed equity ownership, large institutional holdings, a strong emphasis on 
shareholder value maximisation, protection of minority interests through the law and 
regulation and strong requirements for disclosure (Shleifer and Vishny 1986; Walsh and 
Seward 1990; Shleifer and Vishny 1997; Reinecke 2004). In the Anglo-American  tradition, 
the corporate concept is based on the fiduciary relationship between shareholders and 
managers (Jensen and Meckling 1976). The system stresses the importance of the 
enhancement of monitoring and accountability mechanisms (Walsh and Seward 1990). The 
existence of an active external market for shareholders  allows for the threat of hostile 
takeover which is thought to discipline and replace inefficient managers and exert pressure on 
corporate bosses to act in the interest of shareholders (Goldstein 2000; Reinecke 2004). Kay 
and Silberston (1995) assert that the threat of hostile takeover has led to an increased focus 
on shareholder interests and that corporate control is seen as nothing more than a nexus of 
contacts between managers and shareholders.  
 
The system is certainly imperfect. The main criticisms of the Anglo-American regime 
include the short-term perspective adopted by shareholders, the abuse of management power 
and the overriding of other stakeholder interests. The reinforcement of profit-oriented 
behavior and a struggle for material success have shaped the practice of short-term 
shareholder value maximisation behaviour in the Anglo-American model (Moerland 1995). 
The exclusive focus of corporate governance on shareholder wealth maximisation conflicts 
with the interests of other corporate constituencies and those other interests will remain 
ignored, unless managers are legally required to take those interests into account (Maassen 
2002). Marx (1867) termed shareholder-value capital as ‘fictitious capital’ since the return to 
shareholders in the form of dividends and capital gains is not derived from the physical 
properties of the company but from anticipated future earning power (Ireland 2008). 
Consequently, companies operating within the Anglo-American regime have been exposed 
from their inception with fraudulent manipulation of expectations, speculative bubbles, 
periods of frenzied company promotions and spectacular financial collapses (Taylor 2006).  
The GFC has raised questions concerning the effectiveness of “American style” 
corporate governance in serving its stated purpose to safeguard shareholder value (Berle and 
Means 1932; Cadbury 1992; Shleifer and Vishny 1997; Cadbury 2000). Ireland (2008) 
argued that American corporate ownership and governance structures were seriously 
defective through pursuing short-term shareholder returns over longer-term prosperity. 
Motivated by remuneration that was geared to short-term gain, bankers, fund managers and 
board directors have pocketed bonuses with no seeming thought for longer-term 
consequences (The Economist 2008). Smith (1776:50) was aware of some of the limitations 
of “free” markets as markets, by themselves, often destroy the possibility of a decent human 
existence. During the 1990s and 2000s, the trend towards neo-liberalism led to deregulation 
in many of the formerly regulated industries (e.g. banking, electricity, airlines and 
telecommunications) (Baker and Quéré 2010). Former Chairman of the Federal Reserve 
Bank, Alan Greenspan, during his leadership presumed that the self-interests of organizations 
were best capable of protecting their shareholders and the equity of the firm (Mertzanis 2009).  
He stated that increasingly complex financial instruments have contributed to the 
development of a far more efficient, flexible, and hence resilient financial market (The 
Economist 2008). The post GFC turmoil, however, indicates that the consequence of a 
laissez-faire philosophy encouraged financial services to innovate and use high leverage 
created a complex system prone to risk and fraud (Spitzer 2009). Bratton (2002) concludes 
that the incentive structures and their reliance on sophisticated institutional monitoring and 
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the development of “best practice” governance codes in fact, generate less powerful checks 
against abuse.  
The old-fashioned German “social market economy” style capitalism has shown its 
strength during the financial crisis due to its lesser dependence on financial market (Gumbel 
2009). The German trusteeship model positions coronations as institutions of the social 
market economy, which require the manager to ‘balance the conflicting interests of current 
shareholders and additionally to weigh the interests of present and future shareholders’ 
(Ireland 1996:298). Many commentators have believed that the more-stakeholder-friendly 
models developed in Germany and Japan are more socially cohesive than their shareholder-
oriented counterparts in the US and the UK (Ireland 2008). Also they are economically more 
efficient. Freeman et al (2004) suggest that the idea of value creation and trade is intimately 
connected to the idea of creating value for shareholders because business is about putting 
together a deal so that all stakeholders win continuously over time. Stakeholder theory claims 
that whatever the ultimate aim of the corporation, managers must take into account the 
legitimate interests of those groups and individuals who are affected (or be affected) by their 
activities (Freeman 1984; Donaldson and Preston 1995). Donaldson and Preston (1995) 
suggest that stakeholder theory offers a framework for determining the structure and 
operation of the firm to seek multiple and diverging goals. Jensen (2001) argues that 
stakeholder theory should not be viewed as a legitimate contender to value maximisation 
because it fails to provide a complete specification of the corporate purpose and directs 
corporate managers to serve “many masters”. Solomon (2007) sates that a sustainable 
organisation recognises the interdependencies and synergies between the company, its 
stakeholders, its value-based networks and society. The most recent series of corporate 
scandals all took place under the veil of shareholder value maximisation because focusing 
upon a single objective in a complex and uncertain business world leads to short termism and 
a misguided perspective concerning firm performance (Cullen, Kirwan et al. 2006). Knyght, 
Kakabadse et al. (2011) also argue that the requirement of “socialised capitalism” is for the 
public good rather than for the benefit of the selected few and urge for a paradigm shift from 
neo-liberal market economies to a more stakeholder oriented model of capitalism. 
Towards a New Model of Corporate Governance for China?  
Although democracy is an aspirational and desirable model of governance, the democratic 
model promoted by Anglo-American governance principally defined in terms of capitalist 
markets and WTO trade rules is ‘clearly conceived within the fundaments of market 
ideology’ (Sussman and Krader 2008:93). For example, Sussman and Krader (2008) show 
that the democratic motives of the principal U.S. based institutions are to identify ‘targets of 
opportunity’ interventions in Eastern European, and in turn have created a number of the 
“coloured revolutions” in order to advance US economic, military, and strategic political 
objectives under the banner of promoting democracy. Moreover, liberalization of trade 
though GATT/WTO, with Neo-liberal recipes pushed by the World Bank and the IMF, have 
empowered and engaged trans-national corporations (“corpocracy”) and weakened 
governments to the point where national economic policies can no longer be decided by 
elected officials alone but must take into account, if not favor, the interests of huge 
corporations (Kakabadse, Kakabadse et al. 2006; Klein 2007). We, therefore, suggest that the 
Anglo-American model of corporate governance needs to be examined in order to understand 
the underlying motives that underpin it. After the GFC, precipitated by the sub-mortgage 
market failure, reveals the shareholder primacy of the Anglo-American model of corporate 
governance as being no longer the only intellectually respectable efficiency theory. The 
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Anglo-American contractarian corporation defines its own terms without undue legislative 
interference. 
In the context of China, the banking industry still lags behind in corporate 
governance, financial innovation and risk management. The non-market strategies offer 
additional governmental support, favourable laws and effective ways for firms working with 
governmental agencies which alter market conditions. The government agency is the unique 
customer and, at the same time, a provider of scarce resources, legitimacy and recognition, 
local firms need to grow and develop (Li and Zhou 2005). China’s corporate governance 
system needs to mitigate between the two conflicting goals of the allocation of scarce 
resources and local needs. A trade-off has been made between immediate economic growth 
and long-term sustainability. The primary concern is the extent to which the State should 
exercise control in the financial sector. Good corporate governance practices go beyond 
regulation and legislation and consider ethics within a social context. Hence, China needs to 
follow its own path in the reform of the banking sector. The GFC might help China to rethink 
the nature of corporate governance, identify its weakness and assess the current reform 
agenda. 
Development Plan 
The paper will be further developed based on the review of current literature, regulation and 
empirical papers on corporate governance systems. Particular attention will be paid to the 
assessment of the role of the State in risk management and supervision of the further 
deregulated banking sector in China. A conceptual framework will be proposed to help 
China’s policy makers analyse its governance issues, reflect on its strengths and weaknesses 
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